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“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . 
to be confronted with the witnesses against him . . . .”1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
What exactly does the Confrontation Clause mean?  For the past 
seven years, Justice Antonin “Nino” Scalia has been the unlikely 
champion of the defense bar as the author of Crawford v. Washington2 
and of the majority/plurality decisions in (almost) all of the post-
Crawford confrontation cases.  The Supreme Court’s recent dramatic 
resurrection of the Confrontation Clause has generated a flurry of 
activity in the federal and state courts and among legal scholars.  The 
recent and rapidly evolving constitutional doctrine purports to protect a 
vital trial right and to enshrine core historical concerns.  According to 
Justice Scalia in Crawford, “[w]here testimonial statements are at issue, 
the only indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional 
demands is the one the Constitution actually prescribes: confrontation.”3 
In 2004, Crawford seemed to change everything for all federal and 
state criminal defendants by replacing the pre-existing “inherently, and 
therefore permanently unpredictable”4 admissibility standards (borrowed 
from the rules of evidence) with a new categorical constitutional rule.  
After Crawford, prosecutors could no longer rely on state or federal 
rules of evidence.5  Instead, for all statements deemed testimonial by the 
trial court either the witness must be subjected to the “crucible of cross-
examination,”6 or her statement excluded.  Crawford created a new 
threshold confrontation requirement that lower courts identify 
“testimonial statements.”  However, both in and after Crawford, the 
 
 1. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 2. 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 3. See id. at 68-69 (emphasis added).  
 4. Id. at 68 n.10. 
 5. Id. at 51. 
 6. Id. at 61. 
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Court has repeatedly refused to provide clear or consistent criteria 
distinguishing testimonial statements from the infinite range of out-of-
court statements made by victims and witnesses during criminal 
investigations.7  Without clear guidance, the lower courts have generated 
confused and inconsistent confrontation decisions.8 
Until very recently, Justice Scalia has steered the Court’s modern 
confrontation jurisprudence.  However, as discussed below, his 
leadership is increasingly threatened by deep divisions on questions of 
historical accuracy, constitutional interpretation, and the practical 
realities of twenty-first century criminal prosecutions.  By June 2009, 
Justice Scalia could barely muster a plurality for his Melendez-Diaz v. 
Massachusetts9 decision that confrontation extends to expert forensic lab 
analysts relying on  a razor-thin fifth-vote concurrence from Justice 
Thomas, explicitly limited to his own long-held view that the 
Confrontation Clause applies only to formalized statements.10  Melendez-
Diaz also provoked a lengthy, vitriolic, and revealing dissent from 
Justice Kennedy who wrote for Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito 
and Breyer.11 
The four Melendez-Diaz dissenters, who (unlike half of the 
plurality) remain on the Court today, objected to this expansive 
interpretation of the Confrontation Clause on three grounds.  First, the 
Court’s post-Crawford focus on testimonial statements had lost sight of 
the fact that the question should be whether the declarant was a 
“witness” because that is “the word the Framers used in the 
Confrontation Clause.”12  Building on this argument, they argued that 
“witness” should be limited to the conventional/adversarial prosecution 
witnesses and not extended to prosecution experts who have “witnessed 
nothing to give them personal knowledge of the defendant’s guilt.”13  
Finally, the dissenters predicted that Melendez-Diaz would have the 
practical effect of “disrupt[ing] forensic investigations across the country 
 
 7. See Michael H. Graham, Crawford/Davis “Testimonial” Interpreted Removing the 
Clutter; Application Summary, 62 U. MIAMI L. REV. 811, 813 (2008). 
 8. See id. at 813 (noting that after the Crawford Court’s failure to define testimonial 
statements “it was not surprising that lower courts immediately employed a plethora of 
interpretations of ‘testimonial’ leading to conflicting results”).  
 9. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009). 
 10. Id. at 2543 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 11. Id. at 2543-61 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 12. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 13. Id. at 2543  (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (noting that the plurality “makes no attempt to 
acknowledge the real differences between laboratory analysts who perform scientific tests and other, 
more conventional witnesses”). 
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and to put[ting] prosecutions nationwide at risk of dismissal based on 
erratic, all-too-frequent instances when a particular laboratory 
technician, now invested by the Court’s new constitutional designation 
as the analyst, simply does not or cannot appear.”14 
A. The Impact of New and Upcoming Confrontation Cases 
The Supreme Court is revisiting the scope of the Confrontation 
Clause and the definition of “testimonial statements” twice this term.  
On March 1, 2010, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Michigan v. 
Bryant15 and the case was decided on February 28, 2011 (when this 
Article was in the final editing phase).  As predicted and discussed 
below, the Bryant majority (which included all four of the Melendez-
Diaz dissenters) has retreated from seven years of Scalia-lead post-
Crawford confrontation expansion.  The Court held oral argument in its 
second confrontation case, Bullcoming v. New Mexico,16 on March 2, 
2011.  In Bullcoming, the Court will explore the scope of Melendez-Diaz 
when it decides whether live trial testimony from a “surrogate” expert 
witness who did not prepare the defendant’s certified (but unsworn) 
blood alcohol report, but worked in the same lab, satisfies the  
confrontation requirement.17 
In Bryant, the Court addressed the question of whether police 
interrogation of a bleeding gunshot victim while he lay on the ground at 
a gas station just hours before died yielded “testimonial statements” 
under the Confrontation Clause.18  Justice Sotomayor, who wrote for a 
Bryant majority that included the Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy, 
Breyer, and Alito, (with Justice Thomas concurring in the result, Justices 
Scalia and Ginsburg dissenting separately, and Justice Kagan recused) 
found that admission of the victim’s statement did not violate the 
Confrontation Clause because “the circumstances of the interaction 
between Covington and the police objectively indicate that the ‘primary 
purpose of the interrogation’ was ‘to enable police assistance to meet an 
ongoing emergency.’”19  In briefs and during oral argument, petitioner, 
respondent, and a range of amici, had relied on Davis v. Washington20 to 
 
 14. Id. at 2549 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 15. Michigan v. Bryant, 130 S. Ct. 1685 (2010). 
 16. Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 62 (2010).  
 17. Id. 
 18. Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011). 
 19. Id. at 1150 (quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006)). 
 20. 547 U.S. 813 (2006). 
4
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frame the constitutional question as a determination of the objective 
primary purpose of the interrogation.21 
Five years earlier in Davis v. Washington (and its consolidated 
companion case Hammon v. Indiana22), the Court explored two 
statements from opposite ends of the mid-investigation interrogation 
spectrum.   
In Davis, Michelle McCottry made statements to the police during a 
frantic 911 call while she was being assaulted.  The Court held that this 
statement was non-testimonial because it was made “under 
circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the 
interrogation was to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing 
emergency.”23  
In contrast, Amy Hammon prepared a written “battery affidavit” 
following a secured-scene kitchen table police interview.24 Here, the 
circumstances objectively indicated that there was no contemporaneous 
ongoing emergency so the Court presumed that the statements were 
testimonial because “the primary purpose of the interrogation was to 
establish or prove past events potentially relevant to a later criminal 
prosecution.”25   
During the recent October 5, 2010 oral arguments in Bryant, Justice 
Scalia reiterated the constitutional significance of the two different 
circumstances noting that “[t]he crime was ongoing—in Davis when—
when the woman was on the phone with the operator. . . . [and] she was 
seeking help from the emergency that was occurring to her at that 
moment.”26 Bryant, like most mid-investigation interrogations, falls 
somewhere between the two extremes. 
Stop for a minute and imagine the mental gymnastics of attempting 
to divine whether the reasonable about-to-bleed-to-death gunshot victim 
contemplates that identifying his assailant will:  (1) help the police to 
resolve an ongoing emergency; or (2) provide evidence useful to the 
prosecution.  The justices use oral argument for a range of analytic, 
rhetorical, and persuasive purposes.  However, in Bryant, the illogica 
and inoperability of the Crawford/Davis standard were flagrantly 
displayed.  Justice Alito called the objective primary purpose of the 
 
 21. See infra Section IV (discussing the briefs filed in Michigan v. Bryant, cert. granted, 130 
S. Ct. 1685 (2010)).   
 22. 546 U.S. 976 (2005). 
 23. Davis, 547 U.S at 822. 
 24. Id. at 819-20. 
 25. Id. at 822. 
 26. Transcript of Oral Argument at 24, Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011) (No. 09-
150), 2010 WL 3907894. 
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interrogation standard “totally artificial” because the reasonable 
declarant may think “[m]y primary purpose in saying this is so that they 
can respond to an ongoing emergency. . . . [but] I also have the purpose 
of giving them information that could be used at trial.”27 Justice 
Ginsburg opined that examining the actions of the police would not be 
enlightening because “if you want to know what happened, you’d ask 
the very same questions. . . . [because] the questions are relevant also to 
securing the situation.”28  As the argument progressed, the manifold 
ambiguities of this standard continued to surface as the Court wrestled 
with questions that included:  (1) whether all (or most) violent crimes 
committed by unapprehended perpetrators should be considered 
“ongoing emergencies;” (2) whose perception (that of the police or the 
victim/witness) should control; (3) how to reconcile or choose among 
dual or conflicting purposes; (4) whether all statements regarding past 
events (or even all questions phrased in the past tense) resulted in 
testimonial statements; and (5) whether the existence of an ongoing 
emergency (not mentioned in the statement itself) could properly be 
inferred from the facts.29 
Professor Richard D. Friedman, as amicus to the Bryant 
respondent, argued that the proposed “primary investigatory purpose 
standard” should be no problem for future courts because it parallels the 
constitutional standards used to determine custody (under Miranda) or 
reasonable expectations of privacy and reasonable stops and seizures 
(under the Fourth Amendment).30  However, this argument does not 
withstand scrutiny. The Miranda and Fourth Amendment standards ask 
judges to pick between two mutually exclusive alternatives (i.e., a 
suspect either believes she is in custody, or believes she is not in 
custody; a person either has a reasonable expectation of privacy, or she 
does not).  The fundamental problem with the “primary investigatory 
purpose standard” is that in many cases it will be logical and consistent 
for the victim/witness and the police officer to believe that a statement 
could help to resolve an ongoing emergency now and later prove useful 
at trial. 
The Bryant decision has amplified the confrontation confusion.   
Justice Sotomayor employs a scattershot approach that careens among a 
range of possible confrontation factors including:  (1) “the statements 
 
 27. Id. at 8. 
 28. Id. at 5. 
 29. See infra Section IV (discussing the October 5, 2010 Bryant oral argument). 
 30. See Brief of Richard D. Friedman, as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent at 11, 
Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011) (No. 09-150), 2010 WL 2565284. 
6
Akron Law Review, Vol. 44 [2011], Iss. 4, Art. 8
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol44/iss4/8
13-MORENO_44.4_8.14.11_DONE-9.2.11.DOCM 9/12/2011  8:48 AM 
2011] FINDING NINO 1217 
and actions of both the declarant and interrogators;”31 (2) whether the 
ongoing emergency posed a threat to the public at large;32 (3) the 
“informality in an encounter between a victim and police;”33 (4) “the 
parties’ perception that an emergency is ongoing;”34 (5) whether “the 
cause of the shooting was a purely private dispute”35; (6) whether the 
assailant used a gun;36 (7) whether, at the time of the interrogation, the 
police knew the location of the assailant;37 and (8) whether the police 
asked the “type of questions necessary to allow the police to ‘assess the 
situation, the threat to their own safety, and possible danger to the 
potential victim’ and to the public.”38  To add to the confusion, the 
Bryant majority suggests new, but undefined confrontation exceptions 
(beyond the Davis Court’s “ongoing emergencies” exception) noting that 
some out-of-court statements—where the objective primary purpose of 
the investigation was not to resolve an ongoing emergency—do not raise 
confrontation concerns.39  Moreover, for the first time since Crawford, 
the Court seems to reconsider the reliability of the out-of-court 
statement, noting that, “[i]n making the primary purpose determination, 
 
 31. Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1160 (2011).  The Bryant Court actually 
recommended a “combined approach” to assessing the purpose of the declarant and interrogators 
suggesting that this could help to resolve the “[p]redominant . . . problem of mixed motives on the 
part of interrogators and declarants.”  Id. at 1161.  This “combined approach” is both difficult to 
apply (e.g., do the presumed objective intents of the witness/victim and the police have the same 
weight?) and would fail to resolve the frequent problem of dual or conflicting motives (i.e., the 
victim/witness and/or the police intend to respond to an ongoing emergency and develop evidence). 
 32. Id. at 1161.  According to the Bryant majority, “[a]n assessment of whether an emergency 
that threatens the police and public is ongoing cannot narrowly focus on whether the threat solely to 
the first victim has been neutralized because the threat to first responders and to public may 
continue.”  Id. at 1158.  “[T]he duration and scope of an emergency may [also] depend in part on 
the type of weapon employed,” id., and/or “[t]he medical condition of the victim,”(to the extent that 
the victim’s condition sheds light on the purpose for her statement or the magnitude of any ongoing 
safety threat).  Id. at 1159. 
 33. Id. at 1160 (emphasis in original).  According to Justice Sotomayor, the Michigan 
Supreme Court had “too readily dismissed the informality of the circumstances in this case,” id., 
despite the fact that “the questioning in this case occurred in an exposed, public area, prior to the 
arrival of emergency medical services, and in a disorganized fashion.”  Id.  Moreover, “[t]he 
informality suggests that the interrogators’ primary purpose was simply to address what they 
perceived to be an ongoing emergency, and the circumstances lacked any formality that would have 
alerted Covington to or focused him on the possible future prosecutorial use of his statements.” Id. 
at 1166. 
 34. Id. at 1162 (emphasis added). 
 35. Id. at 1163. 
 36. Id. at 1164. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 1165 (quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 832 (2006)). 
 39. Id. at 1155 (“But there may be other circumstances, aside from ongoing emergencies, 
when a statement is not procured with a primary purpose of creating an out-of-court substitute for 
trial testimony.”).  Id. (emphasis in original).  
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standard rules of hearsay, designed to identify some statements as 
reliable, will be relevant.”40  Any return to an Ohio v. Roberts approach 
to confrontation would be an unwelcome development, especially for 
Crawford’s author and champion. 
The recent Bryant decision infuriated Justice Scalia who has lost 
control of the Court’s confrontation jurisprudence.  With trademark 
vitriol, he accused the majority of accepting police lies “so transparently 
false that professing to believe  . . . [them] demeans this institution,” 
joining in an “opinion [that] distorts our Confrontation Clause 
jurisprudence and leaves it in a shambles,” and “[i]nstead of clarifying 
the law, [making] the Court . . . itself the obfuscator of last resort.”41  
Justice Scalia excoriated Justice Sotomayor for writing a decision that 
“is not only a gross distortion of the facts[,] . . . . [but] a gross distortion 
of the law—a revisionist narrative in which reliability continues to guide 
our Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, at least where emergencies and 
faux emergencies are concerned.”42  In his view, Bryant will also have 
serious and deleterious real world ramifications because the majority’s 
“distorted view creates an expansive exception to the Confrontation 
Clause for violent crimes.”43  Bryant is clearly a bitter pill for Justice 
Scalia, who according to Linda Greenwald, used his dissent to 
“administer . . . a public thrashing to a junior colleague” not just because 
“Justice Scalia doesn’t like to lose,” but because he  is “approaching his 
25th anniversary as a Supreme Court justice [and] has cast a long shadow 
but has accomplished surprisingly little . . . . [because n]early every time 
he has come close to achieving one of his jurisprudential goals, his 
colleagues have either hung back at the last minute, or feeling buyer’s 
remorse, retreated at the next opportunity.”44 
The ramifications of Bryant will redound to both criminal practice 
and constitutional interpretation.  In practice, Justice Scalia is likely 
correct that Bryant will lead to the admission of more prosecutor-
sponsored statements that defendants cannot exclude from witnesses 
whom defendants cannot confront.  However, as a constitutional 
standard, Justice Thomas is equally correct that the Bryant majority’s 
objective primary purpose of the interrogation inquiry is an “exercise in 
fiction” that effectively “illustrates the uncertainty that this test creates 
 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 1168 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 42. Id. at 1174. 
 43. Id. at 1173. 
 44. Linda Greenhouse, Justice Scalia Objects, OPINIONATOR, NEW YORK TIMES (Mar. 9, 
2011, 8:40 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/03/09/justice-scalia-objects/. 
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for law enforcement and the lower courts.”45  Bryant will almost 
inevitably exacerbate the problem of erratic and inconsistent decisions as 
our state and federal criminal courts continue to search for the sine qua 
non of the “testimonial statement.”   
A careful examination of the post-Crawford cases, including 
revelations from the recent Bryant briefs and oral argument, provides 
insight into possible future alternatives.  With Justice Scalia’s role in the 
Court’s confrontation jurisprudence on the wane, there is a new 
opportunity for the Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy, Breyer and Alito 
to gain traction to reframe the confrontation inquiry.  This reframed 
confrontation standard is also likely to focus less on the testimonial 
qualities of the out-of-court statement and more on the status of the 
declarant as a “witness[] against the accused.”  Clearly, a more textually 
accurate constitutional inquiry would appeal to the four Melendez-Diaz 
dissenters who remind us that “witness,” rather than “testimonial 
statement” is “the word the Framers used in the Confrontation Clause.”46  
In Melendez-Diaz these four justices adopted the rigid view that 
prosecution-sponsored experts were, by definition, not “witnesses 
against the accused” because they “witnessed nothing to give them 
personal knowledge of the defendant’s guilt.”47  After Melendez-Diaz, 
this argument may be untenable, although this is debatable given Justice 
Thomas’s concurrence.  However, if we assume as a general matter that 
the act of serving as a witness requires a measure of formality, this shift 
should gain purchase with Justice Thomas who, although he concurred 
in both Melendez-Diaz and Bryant, has been a long-standing, consistent, 
and prescient critic of the Court’s confrontation jurisprudence.    
For the sound administration of justice in our criminal courts, it is 
vital that judges have a confrontation standard that they can understand 
and operate.  It makes some sense that judges can more readily ascertain 
from the facts and circumstances whether an out-of-court declarant was 
acting as a “witnesses against the accused”48 (e.g., from evidence of 
police control over the location, duration, and structure of the 
victim/witness interview or evidence of any attempt by the police to 
 
 45. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1167 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 46. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2543 (2009). 
 47. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (noting that the plurality “makes no attempt to acknowledge 
the real differences between laboratory analysts who perform scientific tests and other, more 
conventional witnesses—‘witnesses’ being the word the Framers used in the Confrontation 
Clause”). 
 48. Id. at 2553 (quoting Dowdell v. United States, 221 U.S. 325, 330 (1911)). 
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shape the statement for use in a future criminal trial49) than they can 
discern the objective primary purpose of the investigation. However, 
textual accuracy and operational efficacy bring their own costs.  There is 
strong evidence that an analytic shift towards the act of witnessing and 
away from the testimonial nature of the statement could be used to 
narrow the scope of confrontation.  As discussed below, this could 
impact defendants’ ability to challenge the admission of evidence under 
Bruton v. United States,50 incentivize the creation of new law 
enforcement confrontation workarounds, and diminish the accuracy of a 
wide range of public records.51 
B. Justice Thomas and the Future of the Confrontation Clause 
Almost twenty years ago, Justice Thomas predicted that a 
confrontation doctrine that “[a]ttempts to draw a line between statements 
made in contemplation of legal proceedings and those not so made 
would entangle the courts in a multitude of difficulties.”52  After 
Crawford, and especially after Davis, he has continued to oppose a 
confrontation standard that asked judges to reconstruct the objective 
primary purpose of the interrogation.  According to Justice Thomas, this 
inquiry not only creates “uncertainty . . . for law enforcement,”53 it is 
unnecessary.  The Confrontation Clause, in his view, applies only to 
“formalized testimonial materials such as affidavits, depositions, prior 
testimony, or confessions [because i]t was this discrete category of 
testimonial materials that was historically abused by prosecutors as a 
means of depriving criminal defendants of the benefits of the adversary 
process.”54 
The Crawford and Davis Courts considered the formality of each 
out-of-court statement and these concerns also emerged in Bryant.  
During oral argument, petitioner’s counsel began by focusing on the 
informality of the police interview of Anthony Covington, which was 
conducted while he lay bleeding on the street.55  At the time, Justice 
Scalia dismissed petitioner’s argument stating simply that “[f]ormality or 
 
 49. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, infra note 175, at 
17.  
 50. 391 U.S. 123 (1968). 
 51. See infra Part VI. 
 52. White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 364 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring in part) (emphasis 
added). 
 53. Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1160, 1167 (2011) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 54. White, 502 U.S. at 364 (Thomas, J., concurring in part). 
 55. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 26, at 2. 
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no formality has nothing to do with it.”56  However, the Bryant decision 
suggests that Justice Scalia is now significantly outnumbered by Justices 
who view formality as a relevant confrontation criterion. 
The Bryant Court addressed formality in two ways.  First, as a 
general matter, the Court found that “the most important instances in 
which the Clause restricts the introduction of out-of-court statements are 
those in which state actors are involved in a formal, out-of-court 
interrogation of a witness to obtain evidence for trial.”57  Formal out-of-
court interrogations are the most egregious confrontation violations 
because the “basic purpose of the Confrontation Clause was to ‘targe[t]’ 
the sort of ‘abuses’ exemplified at the notorious treason trial of Sir 
Walter Raleigh.”58  Second, more specifically, the Court concluded that 
the Michigan Supreme Court had “too readily dismissed the informality 
of the circumstances in this case,”59 despite the fact that “the questioning 
. . . [had] occurred in an exposed, public area, prior to the arrival of 
emergency medical services, and in a disorganized fashion.”60  The 
Bryant Court recognized the constitutional significance of the fact that 
“Covington interacted with the police under highly informal 
circumstances as he bled from a fatal gunshot wound.”61  According to 
Justice Sotomayor, this “informality suggests that the interrogators’ 
primary purpose was simply to address what they perceived to be an 
ongoing emergency”62 and “the circumstances [also] lacked any 
formality that would have alerted Covington to or focused him on the 
possible future prosecutorial use of his statements.”63 
If a majority of the Court agrees that formal statements are the most 
egregious confrontation violations, this raises interesting questions about 
the durability of the Court’s adherence to its new objective primary 
purpose of the investigation standard.  Perhaps, as Justice Sotomayor has 
suggested, the formality of an interrogation sometimes reveals 
something about what the reasonable victim/witness and the reasonable 
police office intended.  However, formality emerges as a determinative 
confrontation criterion only if the inquiry shifts towards the textually 
accurate question of whether the out-of-court declarant was acting as a 
“witness[] against the accused” when she made her statement because 
 
 56. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 26, at 4. 
 57. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1155 (emphasis added). 
 58. Id. (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004)). 
 59. Id. at 1160. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1167 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 62. Id. at 1166. 
 63. Id. 
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acting as a witness, as Justice Thomas has observed, requires “a 
solemnity to the process that is not present in a mere conversation.”64   
C. Testing the Boundaries of Traditional Legal Scholarship  
The Court is in the midst of a dramatic exploration of the 
parameters of the Confrontation Clause and the pragmatics of its 
operation.  Justice Scalia is no longer steering the confrontation ship, 
and Crawford/Davis/Bryant have created a new objective primary 
purpose of the interrogation standard that is difficult to comprehend and 
(probably) impossible to operate.   
This Article is an attempt to respond promptly to these new 
developments and to predict some of the post-Scalia trajectory of the 
Court’s confrontation doctrine.  In many ways, this project reflects a 
desire to challenge the more traditional law review process to respond 
more promptly to a dynamic area of legal development.  I am grateful to 
the editors of the Akron Law Review for their indulgence in this effort, 
as we have worked hard over the past few months to incorporate new 
developments as soon as they occurred. 
Roughly speaking, the introductory sections of the Article briefly 
set the stage for analysis of the new and future confrontation cases.  Part 
II begins with the past, providing a brief analysis of the pre-Crawford 
cases to explain how confrontation was merged into the rules of 
evidence.  Part III explores the importance of Crawford and the Court’s 
post-Crawford confrontation jurisprudence.  Part IV examines the new 
constitutional framework created by Michigan v. Bryant.  Part V 
anticipates the role of new and emerging perspectives on the Court.  Part 
VI advances a two-pronged confrontation responsive to recent concerns 
but consistent with post-Crawford precedent.  Finally, the conclusion of 
the Article evaluates the likely legal and social costs disadvantages of a 
clarified (more narrow) confrontation standard including a brief 
discussion of the growing threat to confrontation challenges under 
Bruton v. United States. 65   
 
 64. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 838 (2006). 
 65. 391 U.S. 123 (1968). 
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 II.  HEARSAY AND CONFRONTATION 
A. The Shared Goal of Reliable Evidence 
By the end of the last century, the right to be “confronted” with a 
witness had long been settled to mean the right for defendant’s counsel 
to cross-examine the witness in the defendant’s presence.66  The 
principal area of confrontation controversy involved the determination of 
which out-of-court statements (i.e., which hearsay that was otherwise 
admissible under federal/state evidentiary rules) must be excluded for 
lack of confrontation.67  These decisions rested almost entirely on 
determinations of evidentiary reliability because, as the courts somewhat 
naively and wholly conveniently presumed, the defendant’s right to 
confrontation served this same goal.68 
By 1980, in Ohio v. Roberts,69 the Confrontation Clause had 
become the handmaiden of the rules of evidence. The Roberts Court held 
that confrontation serves simply to “augment accuracy in the fact finding 
process by ensuring the defendant an effective means to test adverse 
evidence.”70  Thus, the Court found that the right is satisfied whenever 
the evidence proffered against the defendant is deemed reliable.  
According to the Roberts Court, since hearsay and the Confrontation 
Clause “‘stem from the same roots’”71 and “‘are generally designed to 
protect similar values,’”72 defendants have no independent constitutional 
right to confront reliable/trustworthy out-of-court statements made by 
unavailable prosecution witnesses.73  After Roberts, a defendant’s right 
to confrontation was satisfied whenever the court found that the 
statement either:  (1) fit within a “firmly rooted hearsay exception;”74 or 
(2) had “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.”75  This decision 
entirely ignored the panoply of strategic defense goals served by the 
cross-examination of prosecution witnesses.  It also ensured that federal 
and state prosecutors could continue to rely on a wide range of 
 
 66. See Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 244 (1895) (“The substance of the 
constitutional protection is preserved to the prisoner in the advantage . . . of seeing the witness face 
to face, and of subjecting him to the ordeal of cross-examination.”). 
 67. See id. 
 68. See id. 
 69. 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
 70. Id. at 65. 
 71. Id. at 66 (quoting Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 86 (1970)). 
 72. Id. (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155 (1970)). 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id.  
 75. Id.  
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inculpatory out-of-court statements whenever the evidence had survived 
defense hearsay challenges or was not challenged. 
B. The Futility of Confronting Reliable Evidence  
Twelve years later, the Court decided White v. Illinois,76 the 
apotheosis of the subjugation of confrontation to evidence law.  White 
was a sexual assault case involving out-of-court statements from a four-
year-old alleged victim.  The White Court found that the Confrontation 
Clause did not require that the prosecution produce the witness or 
establish her unavailability.77  The Court also held that the defendant 
was not entitled to cross-examine the alleged victim because her 
statements fell within the “excited utterance” and “statements for the 
medical treatment” exceptions to the hearsay rule.78  However, the most 
interesting and overlooked component of White decision was the Court’s 
conclusion that cross-examination of an alleged sexual assault victim is 
futile and unnecessary whenever the out-of-court “statement . . . 
qualifies for admission under a ‘firmly rooted’ hearsay exception 
[because it] is so trustworthy that adversarial testing can be expected to 
add little to its reliability.”79 
Even if we accept the White Court’s unrealistic premise that cross-
examination is solely (or even principally) a truth-finding endeavor, the 
Court’s assertion that defense cross-examination of an alleged crime 
victim will do nothing to test the reliability of her allegations is patently 
absurd.80  In effect, the White Court made explicit what had been 
implicit just two years earlier in Ohio v. Roberts—confrontation had 
devolved into an ephemeral right that could be denied whenever a 
criminal court judge deemed the out-of-court statement reliable or the 
defendant failed to object to the admission of the evidence.  This near 
abolition of the right of confrontation by the White majority provoked 
rebuke from the newest member of the Court. 
 
 76. 502 U.S. 346 (1992). 
 77. Id. at 350-58. 
 78. Id. at 357. 
 79. Id. (quoting Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 820-21 (1990) (emphasis added)). 
 80. It is worth contrasting this with the Supreme Court’s earlier assertions that cross 
examination is “the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth,” California v. 
Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970), and “the principal means by which the believability of a witness 
and the truth of his testimony are tested.”  Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315 (1974).    
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C. Justice Thomas Objects 
In a concurring opinion written more than a decade before 
Crawford, Justice Thomas (joined by Justice Scalia) politely warned that 
“our Confrontation Clause jurisprudence has evolved in a manner that is 
perhaps inconsistent with the text and the history of the Clause itself . . . 
[which has] complicated and confused the relationship between the 
constitutional right of confrontation and the hearsay rules of evidence.”81  
Although Justice Thomas conceded that “[t]here is virtually no evidence 
of what the drafters of the Confrontation Clause intended it to mean,”82 
the “strictest reading” would limit confrontation to those witnesses who 
appear and testify at trial.83  However, this interpretation of “witness” as 
limited to trial witnesses would, Justice Thomas conceded, conflict with 
the history of confrontation at common law which had long considered 
the defendant’s right to confront a range of out-of-court statements.84 
Justice Thomas’s most prescient observation was that the Court 
should consider the profound risk of creating a confrontation 
jurisprudence that requires judges to “[a]ttempt[] to draw a line between 
statements made in contemplation of legal proceedings and those not so 
made[, which] would entangle the courts in a multitude of difficulties.”85  
The United States (as amicus curiae) had argued “that the Confrontation 
Clause should apply only to those persons who provide in-court 
testimony or the functional equivalent, such as affidavits, depositions, or 
confessions that are made in contemplation of legal proceedings.”86 
Justice Thomas agreed, noting that “the Confrontation Clause is 
implicated by extrajudicial statements only insofar as they are contained 
in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior 
testimony, or confessions.”87 
III.  CRAWFORD V. WASHINGTON AND A NEW CONFRONTATION RULE 
“Among the biggest news in criminal procedure over the 
past few years—certainly the news with the largest impact 
on criminal trials in this country—has been the Supreme 
 
 81. White, 502 U.S. at 358 (Thomas, J., concurring in part). 
 82. Id. at 359. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 361-63. 
 85. Id. at 364. 
 86. Id. (emphasis added). 
 87. Id. at 365 (emphasis added). 
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Court’s dramatic reinterpretation of the Confrontation 
Clause in Crawford v. Washington . . . .”88 
 
It took the Supreme Court twelve more years to agree that Justices 
Thomas and Scalia were right about two things:  (1) the centrality of the 
text and the history of the Confrontation Clause; and (2) the problem of 
tethering their constitutional jurisprudence to the federal and state 
evidence rules. 
A. The Crawford Decision 
In 2004, Crawford v. Washington resurrected the Confrontation 
Clause by cleanly severing its ties to “firmly rooted” hearsay exceptions 
and all other indicia of evidentiary reliability.89  Crawford involved the 
admission of a tape-recorded, out-of-court statement obtained from the 
defendant’s wife, Sylvia Crawford.90  Sylvia Crawford’s statement was 
made while she was a suspect/witness undergoing stationhouse custodial 
interrogation and after she had been given Miranda warnings.91 At trial, 
Sylvia Crawford invoked the state marital privilege and did not testify; 
her statement was admitted under the hearsay exception for statements 
against interest.92 
Justice Scalia, who wrote for a unanimous Crawford Court, 
emphasized that the Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to 
confrontation to all criminal defendants; yet for decades judges had 
routinely substituted their own ad hoc determinations of evidentiary 
reliability for the “crucible of cross-examination.”93  This practice bore 
the full brunt of Justice Scalia’s estimable ire. According to the 
Crawford Court, “[d]ispensing with confrontation because testimony is 
obviously reliable is akin to dispensing with jury trial because a 
defendant is obviously guilty.”94  Thus, for the first time in decades, the 
Court ignored the rules of evidence and focused instead on the text and 
history of the Sixth Amendment.95 
 
 88. David A. Sklansky, Anti-Inquisitorialism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1634, 1636 (2009). 
 89. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 40 (2004). 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 61. 
 94. Id. at 62 (“The unpardonable vice of the Roberts test, however, is not its unpredictability, 
but its demonstrated capacity to admit core testimonial statements that the Confrontation Clause 
plainly meant to exclude.”). 
 95. Id. at 63. 
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For its textualist analysis, Crawford borrowed heavily from Justice 
Thomas’s concurring opinion in White, but with significant exceptions.  
In White, Justice Thomas had opined that “the critical phrase within the 
[Confrontation] Clause. . . . is ‘witnesses against him.’ . . . [Thus a]ny 
attempt at unraveling and understanding the relationship between the 
Clause and the hearsay rules must begin with an analysis of the meaning 
of that phrase.”96   
Justice Scalia began his opinion for the Crawford Court with a 
similar approach that initially seemed designed to resolve the question of 
who serves as a “witness[] against” the accused.97  The Court sought 
clarification on the relevant terminology from an 1828 edition of 
Webster’s American Dictionary of the English Language which defined 
a “‘witness[]’ against the accused” as one who “‘bear[s] testimony’” and 
defined “‘testimony’” as “‘a solemn declaration or affirmation made for 
the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.’”98  According to the 
Crawford Court, the Framers’ reference to “witness” in the 
Confrontation Clause was not narrowly limited to witnesses who testify 
in court.99  Nor could it properly be read as broad enough to encompass 
all out-of-court declarants.  Instead, according to Justice Scalia, 
“witnesses” should be understood to include those who testify in 
courtrooms or by affidavit and those who bear testimony outside the 
courthouse by making “testimonial statements.”100  Four years later, this 
shift in focus—away from the witness and towards the statement—
would be criticized by the Melendez-Diaz dissenters.  In their view, it is 
a “fundamental mistake . . . to read the Confrontation Clause as referring 
to a kind of out-of-court statement—namely a testimonial statement—
that must be excluded from evidence.”101 
Justice Scalia also examined the history of the Confrontation 
Clause.  Following a lengthy disquisition of the treason trial of Sir 
Walter Raleigh along with other historical materials, the Court held that 
“the principal evil at which the confrontation clause was directed was 
the civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and particularly its use of ex 
parte communications as evidence against the accused.”102  Thus, the 
right to confrontation should be viewed as independent from the rules of 
 
 96. White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 359 (1992). 
 97. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 38. 
 98. Id. at 51 (quoting 2 N. WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE (1828)). 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2550 (2009) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).  
 102. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50.  
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evidence because “the Framers would not have allowed the admission of 
testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he 
was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity 
for cross-examination.”103  As Professor Robert Mosteller would observe 
shortly after Crawford was decided, “[t]he opinion in Crawford provides 
the Court’s (Justice Scalia’s) view of the historical purpose of the 
Confrontation Clause[] [and t]hese historical materials and the 
perspective adopted are obviously selective, but they are now the 
essential materials and the privileged perspective.”104 
After Crawford, federal and state criminal courts could no longer 
base their confrontation decisions on an assessment of evidentiary 
trustworthiness.  Instead, judges would need new tools to distinguish 
“testimonial statements” from the infinite range of out-of-court 
statements from unavailable crime victims and witnesses that would 
inevitably be proffered by future state and federal prosecutors. 
B. The Advent of the “Testimonial Statement” 
Crawford replaced the Ohio v. Roberts reliability/evidence-based 
rule with the constitutional standard that the Confrontation Clause 
applies to all prosecution-sponsored “testimonial statements.”  The act of 
identifying which statements qualify as testimonial would now be of 
great constitutional and practical import.  Twelve years earlier, Justice 
Scalia had shared Justice Thomas’s view that “the Confrontation Clause 
is implicated by extrajudicial statements only insofar as they are 
contained in formalized testimonial materials, such affidavits, 
depositions, prior testimony or confessions.”105 Formality was no longer 
determinative to Justice Scalia who was content to “leave for another 
day”106 any definition of testimonial statements beyond the observation 
that, “[w]hatever else the term covers, it applies at a minimum to prior 
testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former 
trial; and to police interrogations.”107 
Crawford also contained dicta that (rather confusingly) identified, 
but did not endorse, three different alternative definitions of testimonial 
statements. The narrowest of the three definitions echoed Justice 
 
 103. Id. at 53-54 (emphasis added). 
 104. Robert P. Mosteller, Crawford v. Washington:  Encouraging and Ensuring the 
Confrontation of Witnesses, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 511, 514 (2005). 
 105. White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring in part) (emphasis 
added). 
 106. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. 
 107. Id. 
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Thomas’s view that confrontation should be limited to statements 
“‘contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, 
custodial examinations, prior testimony, or confessions.’”108  The second 
and third definitions left more room for interpretation.  The second 
definition (which had been offered by the Crawford petitioner) expanded 
“testimonial statements” to the functional equivalent of ex parte in-court 
testimony such as “‘affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony 
that the defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial 
statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used 
prosecutorially. . . .’”109  The third definition (which had been suggested 
in an amicus brief filed by the National Association of Criminal Defense 
Lawyers) defined as testimonial all statements “‘made under 
circumstances that would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe 
that the statement would be available for use at a later trial.’”110 
The Crawford Court enumerated various types of “formalized 
testimonial materials” that invariably qualified as “testimonial 
statements” (i.e., prior testimony, depositions, and affidavits).111  Oddly, 
Justice Scalia’s list also included confessions, although clearly not all 
confessions are testimonial statements.  In fact, the Crawford Court 
qualified its own reference to post-interrogation confessions noting that 
“we use ‘interrogation’ in its colloquial . . . sense” and because “one can 
imagine various definitions of ‘interrogation’ the Court need not select 
among them in this case [because] Sylvia’s recorded statement, 
knowingly given in response to structured police questioning qualifies 
under any conceivable definition.”112  Here, the Court’s emphasis on  
“structured police questioning” and a “recorded statement” suggests 
consonance with previous emphasis on the formality of the interrogation 
and resulting confession.113  However, as the Court would soon clarify, 
the third, broadest, and most ambiguous conceptualization of 
“testimonial statements” would soon become the new confrontation 
standard. 
  
 
 108. Id. at 52 (quoting White, 502 U.S. at 365). 
 109. Id. at 51 (quoting Brief of the Petitioner at 23, Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 
(2004) (No. 02-9410)). 
 110. Id. at 52 (quoting Brief for National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. as 
Amici Curiae at 3, Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (No. 02-9410)). 
 111. Id. at 51-52. 
 112. Id. at 53 n.4. 
 113. White, 502 U.S. at 365 (including “extrajudicial statements . . . contained in formalized 
testimonial materials, such affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions”). 
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C. Davis v. Washington:  The Ongoing Emergency and Primary 
Purpose Criteria 
Davis v. Washington and its consolidated companion case Hammon 
v. Indiana were two domestic violence cases decided by the Court in 
2006.114  In an opinion that closely tracks the facts of the two cases, the 
Davis Court found that statements made by an alleged victim to a police 
911 operator during a domestic emergency were non-testimonial 
because they were made “under circumstances objectively indicating 
that the primary purpose of interrogation is to enable police assistance to 
meet an ongoing emergency.”115  In contrast, a written and sworn battery 
affidavit prepared under the direction of the police following a secured-
scene police interview were testimonial because they were made “when 
the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing 
emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to 
establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal 
prosecutions.”116 
The Davis Court also found that “formality is indeed essential to 
testimonial utterance”117 and reiterated the Crawford Court’s conclusion 
that “‘[a]n accuser who makes a formal statement to government officers 
bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual remark does 
not.’”118  To emphasize this distinction, Justice Scalia compared Sylvia 
Crawford’s post-Miranda stationhouse custodial interrogation to 
Michelle McCottry’s mid-assault 911 call noting that “the difference in 
the level of formality [between the two interrogations] is striking.”119 
According to the Davis Court, Sylvia Crawford “was responding calmly, 
 
 114. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006); Hammon v. Indiana, 546 U.S. 976 (2005). 
 115. Davis, 547 U.S. at 822. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 830 n.5. 
 118. Id. at 824 (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004)).  This conclusion is 
not undermined by the majority’s unpersuasive assertion that if the interrogation was “solely 
directed at establishing the facts of a past crime, in order to identify (or provide evidence to convict 
the perpetrator)” the resulting victim/witness statement will be akin to a “‘solemn declaration or 
affirmation.’”  Id. (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51).   
  This dicta ignores the Court’s own detailed effort to distinguish Michelle McCottry’s 
informal 911 call where “she was not acting as a witness” from Sylvia Crawford’s formal 
stationhouse interview.  Id. at 828 (emphasis in original).  It is also effectively refuted by Justice 
Thomas, who argued that “[t]he possibility that an oral declaration of past fact to a police officer, if 
false, could result in legal consequences to the speaker may render honesty in casual conversations 
with police officers important. It does not, however, render those conversations solemn or formal in 
the ordinary meanings of those terms.” Id. at 838 n.3 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part). 
 119. Id. at 814. 
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at the station house, to a series of questions, with the officer interrogator 
taping and making notes of her answers”120 while Michelle McCottry 
provided  “frantic answers . . . over the phone, in an environment that 
was not tranquil, or even (as far as any reasonable 911 operator could 
make out) safe.”121  Thus, as a constitutional matter Michelle McCottry 
“was not acting as a witness; she was not testifying . . . [and w]hat she 
said was not ‘a weaker substitute for live testimony’ at trial.”122 
Unlike Crawford, which had involved a suspect’s/witness’s 
structured and recorded post-Miranda stationhouse custodial 
interrogation, the Davis statements were taken from victims at the crime 
scene during or shortly after crimes of violence.  Thus, Davis provided 
the Court with the opportunity to elaborate on the defining 
characteristics of a testimonial statement taken under common, if more 
complex, circumstances.  However, Justice Scalia opted to forgo this 
opportunity with the (implausible) excuse that the Court cannot be 
expected to create “an exhaustive classification of all conceivable 
statements—or even all conceivable statements in response to police 
interrogation—as either a testimonial or non-testimonial . . . .”123 
D. Giles v. California:  Forfeiture of the Right to Confrontation by 
Wrongdoing  
In 2006, in Giles v. California,124 the Supreme Court addressed the 
related question of forfeiture of confrontation by wrongdoing.  During 
defendant’s murder trial, the prosecutor had introduced statements made 
by the victim (defendant’s former girlfriend) to the police during a 
domestic violence incident three weeks before the alleged murder.125  On 
appeal, defendant argued that admission of the victim’s statements 
violated his right to confrontation under Crawford.   The California 
Court of Appeals and the California Supreme Court both held that the 
defendant had forfeited his right to confront the victim by killing her.126 
When Giles reached the Supreme Court, Justice Scalia, once again 
writing for the majority, disagreed.  According to the Giles Court, a 
defendant does not forfeit his right to confrontation by his own 
 
 120. Id. at 827. 
 121. Id.  
 122. Id. at 828 (quoting United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 394 (1986)). 
 123. Id. at 822. 
 124. 554 U.S. 353 (2008). 
 125. Id. at 356-57. 
 126. See People v. Giles, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d 843, 850 (2004); People v. Giles, 152 P.3d 433, 435 
(Cal. 2007). 
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wrongdoing unless the prosecution can establish that the defendant 
intended through his actions to prevent the witness from testifying.127  
Any other intent will not suffice because, under the common law “the 
‘wrong’ and ‘evil Practices’ to which . . . statements [defining forfeiture] 
referred was conduct designed to prevent a witness from testifying.”128  
Although the Giles Court acknowledged that “the absence of a forfeiture 
rule covering this sort of conduct would create an intolerable incentive 
for defendants to bribe, intimidate, or even kill witnesses against 
them,”129 it could not accept the “notion that judges may strip the 
defendant of a right that the Constitution deems essential to a fair trial, 
on the basis of a prior judicial assessment that the defendant is guilty as 
charged . . . . [because that would be] akin . . . to ‘dispensing with jury 
trial because a defendant is obviously guilty.’”130 
Although Giles was focused on forfeiture, two members of the 
Court seized the opportunity to articulate their growing concerns about 
the trajectory of the confrontation doctrine.  Justice Thomas’s concurring 
opinion reiterated his long-standing view “that statements like those 
made by the victim in this case do not implicate the Confrontation 
Clause” because “the police questioning was not ‘a formalized dialogue’ 
. . . because ‘the statements were neither Mirandized nor custodial, nor 
accompanied by any similar indicia of formality . . . .’”131  Similar 
concerns were expressed, for the first time, by Justice Alito who wrote a 
separate concurrence  
to make clear that, like Justice Thomas, I am not convinced that 
the out-of-court statement at issue here fell within the 
Confrontation Clause in the first place . . . . [because] the 
Confrontation Clause does not apply to out-of-court statements 
unless it can be said that they are the equivalent of statements 
made at trial by ‘witnesses.’132 
E. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts:  Expert Witnesses and 
Testimonial Statements  
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts arose out of a Boston police 
investigation that resulted in the arrest of Luis Melendez-Diaz and the 
 
 127. Giles, 554 U.S. at 367-68; see FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6). 
 128. Giles, 554 U.S. at 365 (emphasis in original). 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004)). 
 131. Id. at 377-78 (quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 840 (2006) (Thomas, J., 
concurring)). 
 132. Id. at 378 (Alito, J., concurring) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. VI). 
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discovery of nineteen bags of white powder hidden in the back seat of a 
police patrol car.133  The defendant was charged with distributing and 
trafficking in cocaine.134 At his trial, the Commonwealth submitted three 
“‘certificates of analysis.’”135  These certificates reported the amount of 
white powder seized from the defendant and detailed how the powder 
had been “examined with the following results:  The substance was 
found to contain:  Cocaine.”136  As required by state law, the three 
certificates had been sworn to before a notary public.137  The 
Massachusetts statutory design was clear.  Sworn and notarized 
certificates of analysis were intended to promote accurate crime 
laboratory analyses and to provide prima facie evidence of the 
composition, quality, and weight of the tested substance.138  Thus, when 
certificates of analysis were offered at trial, prosecutors for the 
Commonwealth could, but need not, call the analyst to testify. 
At trial, the defendant objected to admission of the certificates as a 
violation of his confrontation rights as construed by the Supreme Court 
in Crawford.139 The defendant’s request was denied by the trial court 
and the decision to admit the certificates was affirmed by the 
Massachusetts Appellate Court.140 The United States Supreme Court 
granted certiorari to resolve open questions about the impact of 
Crawford on defendant’s opportunity to cross-examine prosecutor’s 
expert witnesses. 
In his June 2009 opinion for the Court in Melendez-Diaz, Justice 
Scalia wrote for an eclectic plurality that included Justices Stevens, 
Souter and Ginsburg.  In the first few pages of the plurality opinion, 
Justice Scalia concluded that the lab certificates were testimonial 
statements because:  (1) they were affidavits; (2) they were “‘made 
under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably 
to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later 
trial;’”141 and (3) because “we can safely assume that the analysts were 
 
 133. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2530 (2009). 
 134. Id.  
 135. Id. at 2531. 
 136. Id.  
 137. Id.  
 138. Id. at 2532 (the “purpose of the affidavits was to provide ‘prima facie evidence of the 
composition, quality, and the net weight’ of the analyzed substance”) (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS, 
ch. 111, § 13). 
 139. Id. at 2531. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at 2531 (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51-52 (2004)). 
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aware of the affidavits’ evidentiary purpose . . . .”142  The first rationale 
provides the only point of agreement with Justice Thomas whose 
concurrence was the essential fifth vote.143 
Justice Kennedy, who wrote for the four Melendez-Diaz dissenters 
(Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito and Breyer), argued that 
“witnesses against the accused” are limited to conventional/adversarial 
prosecution witnesses and cannot be extended to experts who have 
“witnessed nothing to give them personal knowledge of the defendant’s 
guilt.”144  The length and tone of the dissent suggests that four members 
of the current Court have profound analytic and practical concerns about 
the Court’s post-Crawford trajectory.  In their view, this unwarranted 
expansion of the right to confront will “disrupt forensic investigations 
across the country and put prosecutions nationwide at risk of dismissal 
based on erratic, all-too-frequent instances when a particular laboratory 
technician, now invested by the Court’s new constitutional designation 
as the analyst, simply does not or cannot appear.”145 
On September 29, 2010, the United States Supreme Court granted 
certiorari in Bullcoming v. New Mexico146 to address a question left open 
by Melendez-Diaz.  In Bullcoming, the Court will decide whether trial 
testimony from a “surrogate” expert witness who did not prepare the 
defendant’s certified blood alcohol report, but worked in the same lab 
and relied on the report for his own opinions, satisfied the Confrontation 
Clause.147  Bullcoming will likely revive the Melendez-Diaz question of 
the nature and extent of expert witness confrontation. 
IV.  THE CURRENT CONFRONTATION STANDARD:  THE PRECARIOUS 
CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF MICHIGAN V. BRYANT 
A. Facts and Legal History 
On the night of April 29, 2001, five Detroit police officers 
responded to a report of a shooting and found Anthony Covington lying 
 
 142. Id. at 2532. 
 143. Id. at 2543. 
 144. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (noting that the plurality “makes no attempt to acknowledge 
the real differences between laboratory analysts who perform scientific tests and other, more 
conventional witnesses—‘witnesses’ being the word the Framers used in the Confrontation 
Clause”). 
 145. Id. at 2549 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 146. 131 S. Ct. 62 (2010). 
 147. Id. 
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on the ground next to his car in a gas station driveway.148  The police 
officers could see that Covington had been shot and could see blood on 
the front of his shirt.149  The officers asked about his wound and assured 
him that an EMS unit had been dispatched.150  When they asked him, 
“What happened?” he responded, “I’ve been shot.”151 The officers asked 
Covington who shot him, and he told them it was Rick.152   Covington 
also told them that Rick has shot him through the door of a nearby house 
and that after he was shot he had driven himself a few blocks to the gas 
station.153  EMS arrived and transported Covington to the hospital where 
he died from his wounds several hours later.154 
Richard Perry Bryant was arrested in March 2002.155  At Bryant’s 
homicide trial, Covington’s statements were admitted as excited 
utterance exceptions to the hearsay rule.156  Although the victim’s 
statements were also arguably dying declarations, the prosecutor failed 
to raise this argument at trial.  Bryant was convicted of second degree 
murder and possession of a firearm.157 
On direct appeal to the Michigan Court of Appeals, the defendant’s 
conviction was affirmed.158  The appellate court found that the admission 
of Covington’s statement did not violate the Confrontation Clause 
because they were not testimonial statements under Crawford.159  After 
Davis was decided in 2006, the United States Supreme Court remanded 
the case to the state court of appeals.160  However, Davis apparently had 
no impact, because the appellate court again concluded that Covington’s 
statements were non-testimonial because they had been made “in the 
course of a police interrogation under circumstances objectively 
indicating that its primary purpose was to enable police assistance to 
meet an ongoing emergency.”161 
 
 148. Brief for Respondent at 1, Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011) (No. 09-150), 2010 
WL 2481866. 
 149. Id. at 2. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 1. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at 2. 
 155. Id. at 6. 
 156. Id. at 3. 
 157. Id. at 6. 
 158. Id.  
 159. People v. Bryant, No. 247039, 2004 WL 188266 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 24, 2004) (per 
curiam). 
 160. People v. Bryant, 756 N.W.2d 50 (Mich. 2008). 
 161. People v. Bryant, No. 247039, 2007 WL 675471, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 6, 2007). 
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On June 10, 2009, the Michigan Supreme Court reversed the court 
of appeals.162  Using the same constitutional standard which they defined 
as “whether the victim’s statements were made in the course of police 
interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary 
purpose of the interrogation was to enable police to meet an ‘ongoing 
emergency,’”163 the state supreme court reached the opposite 
conclusion.164 
The three dissenting Michigan Supreme Court judges strongly 
disagreed that the facts revealed that Covington’s primary investigatory 
purpose was to provide information “to enable the police to identify, 
locate, and apprehend the perpetrator.”165  In a very brief dissent, Judge 
Weaver explained that the evidence suggested that “the declarant’s 
statements were made in the course of a police interrogation under 
circumstances objectively indicating that the interrogation’s primary 
purpose was to enable police assistance in an ongoing emergency.”166  
Judge Corrigan, who was joined in his dissent by Judge Young, agreed 
with Judge Weaver, adding that Covington’s evidentiary intent was 
clearly to resolve an emergency created by a shooting by an 
unapprehended suspect.167  Because most mid-investigation statements 
from crime victims/witnesses occur after the crime has occurred, the 
dissenters accused the majority of “assum[ing] too much when it 
concludes that there was no ongoing emergency because the shooting 
necessarily occurred 30 minutes earlier.”168 
The state court history of Bryant effectively demonstrates that  
judges asked to divine whether the primary purpose of an interrogation 
was to:  (1) help the police resolve an emergency; or (2) to provide 
evidence for later use, can reach inconsistent and contradictory 
conclusions.  In many cases both purposes are plausible, either purpose 
can be supported by the facts, and the two purposes are neither mutually 
exclusive nor logically inconsistent.  It did not help, that throughout the 
state court appellate process, the judges consistently failed to clarify 
whose primary purpose should control the analysis or to address the 
 
 162. People v. Bryant, 768 N.W.2d 65 (Mich. 2009). 
 163. Id. at 70 (quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006)). 
 164. Id. at 71. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at 79 (Weaver, J., dissenting). 
 167. Id. at 80 (Corrigan, J., dissenting). 
 168. Id. 
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inevitable complications of ambiguous, shifting, or conflicting 
purposes.169 
B. Bryant and the Objective Primary Purpose of the Investigation 
Standard 
1. The Parties Begin with a Similar Approach 
In briefs filed with the United States Supreme Court in April 2010, 
the state of Michigan (petitioner) argued that, after Davis and under the 
Confrontation Clause, “[s]tatements are non-testimonial when made in 
the course of police investigations under circumstances objectively 
indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable 
police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.”170  Bryant’s counsel 
(respondent) similarly suggested that the victim’s “out-of-court 
statements . . . met the Crawford and Davis tests for testimonial 
statements, as they were made with a primary purpose of providing 
evidence relevant to past criminal behavior.”171  The only distinction 
between the two arguments was that the respondent urged the Court to 
focus on the reasonable declarant’s primary purpose, while the petitioner 
advanced a more ambiguous “purpose of the investigation” standard. 
2. Petitioner’s Early Attempt to Integrate Formality Concerns 
The Bryant petitioner’s argument focused almost exclusively on the 
question of whether “an interrogation’s primary purpose is to help police 
handle an ongoing emergency . . . .”172  However, petitioner also urged 
the Court to consider its own Davis conclusion that “testimonial 
statements” under the Confrontation Clause must “necessarily include 
some sense of formality or solemnity . . . .”173  Although, neither 
petitioner’s brief nor petitioner’s oral argument mentioned Justice 
Thomas’s concurrence in White, petitioner reminded the Court that 
Crawford had defined “‘testimony’ to typically include ‘a solemn 
declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or 
 
 169. Professor Richard D. Friedman has consistently argued that the perspective must be that 
of the reasonable declarant.  See, e.g., Brief of Richard D. Friedman, as Amicus Curiae in Support 
of Respondent, supra note 30, at 7.  
 170. Petitioner’s Brief on the Merits at 8, Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011) (No. 09-
150), 2010 WL 1776430 (emphasis added).  
 171. Brief for Respondent, supra note 148, at 26 (emphasis added). 
 172. Petitioner’s Brief on the Merits, supra note 170, at 8. 
 173. Petitioner’s Brief on the Merits, supra note 170, at 6. 
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proving some fact.’”174  A more detailed and persuasive argument for 
formality as a critical criterion of confrontation was advanced by (then) 
Solicitor General Elena Kagan as amicus for petitioner.175 
3. Elaboration on the Formality Argument from Petitioner’s 
Amicus 
Solicitor General Kagan actually made two related arguments.  
First, after Crawford, “testimonial” applies only “to those modern 
practices most closely related to the historical use of ex parte 
examinations as evidence against the accused.”176  As the Crawford 
Court had explained, attention to the formality of the making of the 
statement makes sense because the Confrontation Clause is “especially 
acute[ly] concerned” with “‘[a]n accuser who make a formal statement 
to government officers [and thus] bears testimony . . . .’”177  This 
argument, which was adopted by the Bryant Court,178 effectively linked 
formality to consideration of the more textually precise and historically 
accurate question of whether the declarant had acted as a “witness[] 
against the accused.”  The Solicitor General’s second argument was a 
practical elaboration on how judges might make the determination of 
whether a victim/witness made a formal statement equivalent to trial 
testimony including:  (1) whether “[t]he police officers had . . . control 
over the location of the interview;”179 (2) whether the police controlled 
the duration of the interview or “had only a few minutes to ask questions 
before the paramedics arrived;” 180 and (3) whether the police had the 
“opportunity to structure their questions, . . . [or to] attempt to shape . . . 
[the victim’s] testimony for use in a future criminal trial.”181  According 
to Solicitor General Kagan, this inquiry would facilitate adherence to the 
Court’s post-Crawford doctrinal focus on “‘modern practices with the 
 
 174. Petitioner’s Brief on the Merits, supra note 170, at 7 (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 
541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004)). 
 175. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 13, Michigan v. 
Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011) (No. 09-150), 2010 WL 1848212.  Of course, it is relevant that 
Elena Kagan is now a member of the Court, despite the fact that one cannot assume that, in her new 
role Justice Kagan will maintain these same views. 
 176. Id. at 8. 
 177. Id. at 11 (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51). 
 178. See Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011). 
 179. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 175, at 17. 
 180. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 175, at 17. 
 181. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 175, at 17. 
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closest kinship to the abuses at which the Confrontation Clause was 
directed.’”182 
4. Respondent Addresses the Formality Argument 
The Bryant respondent also (accurately) anticipated that the Court 
would include formality as a component of its confrontation analysis, 
but hoped to prevent this from happening by persuading the Court that 
all statements to the police are formal.  To support this argument, 
respondent asserted that “[t]his court held in Davis that statements made 
to investigating police officers are sufficiently solemn and formal for the 
purposes of the Confrontation Clause because witnesses should be aware 
that giving a false statement to the police is itself criminal.”183  Even 
Justice Scalia, who so dislikes formality as a criterion of confrontation 
analysis that he remarked during Bryant oral argument, “[f]orget about 
formality, in other words . . . Formality or no formality has nothing to do 
with it,”184 should find this assertion implausible.  In fact, it has already 
been persuasively refuted by Justice Thomas, who argued in Davis that a 
declarant’s knowledge that a false statement to the police “could result 
in legal consequences to the speaker, . . . may render honesty in casual 
conversations with police officers important.  It does not, however, 
render those conversations solemn or formal in the ordinary meanings of 
those terms.”185  
5. Elaboration on the Formality Argument from Respondent’s 
Amicus 
Respondent’s amicus also anticipated the Court’s interest in 
testimonial formality.   The National Association of Defense Lawyers 
(“NACDL”) argued (without support) that formality should have no 
independent role in the Court’s confrontation analysis.  Thus, the Court 
should simply adopt the “general principle that statements should not be 
exempted for lack of formality where evidentiary purpose is otherwise 
shown.”186 In the alternative, NACDL argued that all testimonial 
 
 182. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 175, at 11 
(quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68). 
 183. Brief for Respondent, supra note 148, at 21-22 (citing Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 
813, 826-27 (2006)). 
 184. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 26, at 4. 
 185. Davis, 547 U.S. at 838 n.3 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 186. Brief of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae in 
Support of Respondent at 14, Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011) (No. 09-150), 2010 WL 
2569158.  
29
Moreno: Finding Nino
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2011
13-MORENO_44.4_8.14.11_DONE-9.2.11.DOCM 9/12/2011  8:48 AM 
1240 AKRON LAW REVIEW [44:1211 
statements are formal because they have the capacity to engender a 
formal result by “provid[ing] a basis for official action, the arrest of the 
suspected offender.”187 
Professor Richard D. Friedman, a leading authority on 
confrontation jurisprudence whose work and advocacy before the Court 
has helped shape recent developments in the field, filed an amicus brief 
in favor of respondent.  Professor Friedman argued that the Court should 
not consider any facts and circumstances relating to formality of the act 
of serving as a witness because “it would stand logic on its head to treat 
a statement as non-testimonial, even though it was made in anticipation 
of prosecutorial use, on the ground that it was made informally. . . . 
[because t]he very point of the Confrontation Clause is to ensure that 
testimony is given under required formalities.”188  This argument 
deserves some attention. 
It is inarguable that informal mid-investigation statements to the 
police can do just as much inculpatory damage as formal statements.  
There are also many compelling reasons to prefer a more expansive 
interpretation of the Confrontation Clause including a desire for fair 
trials, concerns about leveling the playing field, or disappointment with 
judges’ ability to accurately or consistently operate the relevant 
standards and rules; but Professor Friedman is making a different point.  
He has argued that because the Confrontation Clause guarantees certain 
trial formalities (cross-examination), it is illogical to limit “witnesses 
against the accused” to the subset of out-of-court declarants who qualify 
as “witnesses” because they have made out-of-court statements under 
more formal circumstances (in affidavits or during structured police 
interrogation).189  The logic of Professor Friedman’s argument depends 
on a false conflation of the two “formalities.”  The guaranteed “trial 
formality” of live witness cross-examination (“the very point of the 
Confrontation Clause”) serves a range of vital defense interests.  In 
contrast, a “definitional formality” that sets forth factors that distinguish 
witnessing from talking would serve the entirely different goal of 
limiting the potentially infinite range of out-of-court declarants to those 
who must be subject to confrontation.   
Finally, Professor Friedman rejected possible pragmatic concerns 
arguing that a primary investigatory purpose standard is analogous to the 
 
 187. Id. at 16.  
 188. Brief of Richard D. Friedman, as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent, supra note 30, 
at 16. 
 189. Brief of Richard D. Friedman, as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent, supra note 30, 
at 16. 
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constitutional standards routinely used by judges to determine custody 
(under Miranda) or reasonable expectations of privacy and reasonable 
stops and seizures (under the Fourth Amendment).190 
This second argument is not compelling.  These other constitutional 
inquiries are not analogous because (unlike the objective primary 
purpose of the interrogation) they each involve a binary choice between 
mutually exclusive alternatives.  A suspect either believes she is in 
custody, or believes she is not in custody.  A person either has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy, or she does not.  The fundamental 
problem with a confrontation standard that requires judges to determine 
the primary purpose of the reasonable victim/witness and police officer 
mid-investigation is that in many cases it will be logical and consistent 
for the victim/witness and the police officer to believe that a statement 
could help to resolve an ongoing emergency now and later prove useful 
at trial. 
V.  THE POST-SCALIA FUTURE OF THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE 
A. Insight from the Bryant Oral Arguments 
1. Nailing Down the Objective Primary Purpose of the 
Interrogation 
On October 5, 2010, the Court heard oral argument in Bryant.  It 
was clear from the start that the objective primary purpose of the 
interrogation standard is difficult, if not impossible, to operate.  As an 
initial matter, the Justices thoroughly disagreed about whose primary 
purpose should control.  Justice Scalia supported respondent’s argument 
that “it’s the purpose of the declarant, not of the questioner.”191  In 
contrast, the Chief Justice opined that “the focus seems to be on the 
purpose of the interrogation, which seems to be the question of what the 
police thought, not what the—the person dying thought.”192    
Justice Ginsburg added to the confusion by contributing her 
realistic concern regarding dual purposes (to resolve an emergency and 
to provide evidence) which might coexist not only in the same person, 
but even in the same question or statement.  According to Justice 
Ginsburg, “it seems to me, here, if you want to know what happened, 
 
 190. See Brief of Richard D. Friedman, as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent, supra 
note 30, at 11. 
 191. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 26, at 6. 
 192. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 26, at 11. 
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you would ask the very same questions. . . . [because] the questions are 
relevant also to securing the situation. . . . [so] what different questions 
would you ask if you wanted to find out what happened?”193  Justice 
Alito echoed Justice Ginsburg’s concern questioning both the logic and 
operability of the proposed primary purpose standard: 
   In a situation like this, do you think it’s meaningful to ask 
what the primary purpose of the victim was when he responded 
to the police and said who shot him?  
   You have a man who has just been shot.  He has a wound 
that’s going to turn out to be fatal, and he’s lying there on the 
ground bleeding profusely, and he says:  My primary purpose in 
saying this is so that they can respond to an ongoing emergency?  
No, but I also have the purpose of giving them information that 
could be used at trial, but it’s a little less—that’s a little bit less 
my purpose than responding to the ongoing emergency.194 
Finally, the Court considered the important question of whether the 
primary purpose of the interrogation must be evident from the statement 
itself or could be inferred from the relevant facts.  On this point, Chief 
Justice Roberts disagreed with respondent’s counsel’s assertion that the 
ongoing emergency must be clear from the statement.  Using a school 
shooting hypothetical, the Chief Justice posited that if the witness said 
“the principal did it.  It’s 10:00 in the morning, you assume the principal 
is at the school and he says the principal did it.  You can infer from the 
circumstances that he’s referring to an ongoing emergency.”195 
2. Reconsidering Evidentiary Reliability 
Some members of the Court used the Bryant oral argument to raise 
dormant questions about evidentiary reliability.  This line of inquiry  
began with a nod to Crawford as Justice Kennedy noted that “Crawford 
rejects reliability as a criteria [sic]”196 and was followed by Justice 
Scalia’s more precise observation that “there is no basis for saying . . . 
the Confrontation Clause pertains only to reliability.”197  However, 
Justice Sotomayor wondered whether the assumption that a police 
interrogation had been aimed at risk assessment means “we’re back to 
the reliability test, really, . . . [because i]t goes to the very essence of 
 
 193. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 26, at 5. 
 194. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 26, at 7-8. 
 195. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 26, at 57. 
 196. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 26, at 15. 
 197. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 26, at 42 (emphasis added). 
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reliability.”198  Later on Justice Kennedy seemed to share Justice 
Sotomayor’s concern when he commented that if “there was an 
emergency and the police were asking questions in order to mitigate the 
emergency,”199 under these circumstances the “police likely have less 
motive to manipulate the—the statements and to ask loaded questions[.]  
That in itself, it seems to me, is . . . reliabil[ity].”200  Towards the end of 
the oral argument, after a series of questions to respondent’s counsel 
regarding the type of questions police ask to resolve ongoing 
emergencies, Justice Kennedy concluded: “Isn’t there a reliability 
component that underlies this whether we like it or not?” 201 
3. Are all Statements about Past Events Testimonial? 
The most significant and comical disagreements arose when the 
justices attempted to draw lines between testimonial and non-testimonial 
statements based on whether the statements related to past events.  
Justice Scalia began with the preposterous assertion that during ongoing 
emergencies people simply do not ask or speak about past events.  
According to Justice Scalia, “if it was an emergency, he [the police 
officer] wouldn’t have asked, What happened?  He would ask, What is 
happening?  [Because t]o ask what happened is to ask the declarant to 
describe past events, which is testimonial.”202  Justice Alito was clearly 
not convinced and he sought clarification from respondent asking: “Is—
can there be an ongoing emergency where the statement relates—where 
the statement recounts something that has occurred, not something that 
is occurring?”203  Respondent replied that “if the witness only gives a 
statement that relates to past, completed events, then it's not a showing 
of—of an ongoing emergency.”204  At this point, the Chief Justice 
intervened to remind everyone that, of course, a statement could relate 
“something that happened in the past, he shot me, . . . [and] at the same 
time demonstrate[] an ongoing emergency because he’s right there and 
he might shoot you.”205 
4. Operating the Objective Primary Purpose of the Investigation 
 
 198. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 26, at 15. 
 199. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 26, at 26. 
 200. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 26, at 27. 
 201. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 26, at 38. 
 202. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 26, at 13. 
 203. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 26, at 44. 
 204. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 26, at 44. 
 205. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 26, at 45.  
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Standard 
Justice Thomas, as is his wont, did not participate in the Bryant oral 
argument.  However, the spectacle of his colleagues’ confusion 
confirmed the accuracy of his five-year-old Davis prediction that  
[i]n many, if not most, cases where police respond to a report of 
a crime, whether pursuant to a 911 call from the victim or 
otherwise, the purposes of an interrogation, viewed from the 
perspective of the police, are both to respond to the emergency 
situation and to gather evidence.  Assigning one of these two 
“largely unverifiable motives,” primacy requires constructing a 
hierarchy of purpose that will rarely be present—and is not 
reliably discernible.  It will inevitably be, quite simply, an 
exercise in fiction.206 
These increasingly obvious operational problems may have 
precipitated Justice Breyer’s concern that the Court had gone too far.  
During oral argument, Justice Breyer (who had joined both the Crawford 
and Davis majorities) now sought a principled way to distinguish the 
following scenarios: 
[p]eople going into a room and saying, “now write out your 
testimony,” and they write it out in the form of an affidavit, or 
they send in a letter, and they say “bye,” and then they walk next 
door to the trial and introduce it.  I mean, that’s Walter Raleigh, 
in my mind.  
And on the other side of the line, is an evidentiary rules [sic] that 
are basically in State cases run by the State.  And they 
sometimes let hearsay in, and they sometimes don’t, and they 
make reliability et cetera judgments in developing their—their 
decision as to how hearsay exceptions will work.207 
In Justice Breyer’s view, if statements like Anthony Covington’s 
required confrontation, the Court would be endowing the Confrontation 
Clause with the power to swallow a range of federal and state 
“exceptions to hearsay testimony, which have been well-established in 
the United States for 200 years.”208 
 
 206. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 839 (2006) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part).  
 207. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 26, at 47-48. 
 208. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 26, at 50. 
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B. Insight from the Court’s Decision in Bryant 
Although Justice Scalia called Bryant “an absurdly easy case,”209 
the confused oral argument presaged an opinion that, as discussed above, 
ricochets among a range of possible confrontation criteria including: 
1. “[T]he statements and actions of both the declarant and 
interrogators.”210 
2. Whether the ongoing emergency posed a threat to the public 
at large.211 
3. The “informality in an encounter between a victim and 
police.”212 
4. “The parties’ perception that an emergency is ongoing.”213 
5. Whether “the cause of the shooting was a purely private 
dispute.”214 
6. Whether the assailant used a gun.215 
7. Whether, at the time of the interrogation, the police knew the 
location of the assailant.216 
8. Whether the police asked the “type of questions necessary to 
allow the police to ‘assess the situation, the threat to their own 
safety, and possible danger to the potential victim’ and to the 
public . . . .”217 
Justice Sotomayor makes little effort to prioritize these factors or to 
explain to the lower courts how conflicts should be resolved.  To cite 
just a few likely areas of ongoing confusion:  (1) Should the parties’ (or 
even the reasonable parties’) perception of an ongoing emergency 
control, if the facts indicate that the emergency has been resolved?; (2) 
What factors should courts use to determine the formality of a mid-
investigation encounter between the police and a victim/witness?; (3) 
Does the use of a gun always create a non-private dispute and/or a threat 
 
 209. Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1170 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 210. Id. at 1148.   
 211. Id. at 1156. 
 212. Id. at 1160 (emphasis in original). 
 213. Id. at 1162 (emphasis added). 
 214. Id. at 1163. 
 215. Id. at 1164. 
 216. Id. at 1163. 
 217. Id. at 1166 (quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 832 (2006)). 
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to the public at large?; or (4) If the police do not know the location of the 
suspect, when is the emergency no longer ongoing? 
In fact, the threshold question of whose objective primary purpose 
controls, which was front and center in both the Bryant briefs and oral 
argument, has not even been resolved.  In his dissent, Justice Scalia 
posited that “[t]he declarant’s intent is what counts.”218  However, in her 
decision for the majority, Justice Sotomayor concluded that “Davis 
requires a combined inquiry that accounts for both the declarant and the 
interrogator.”219  In the view of the Bryant majority, a “combined 
inquiry” will “ameliorate[] problems that could arise from looking solely 
to one participant.”220 This is unlikely given the inevitable complexities 
of real life crime scenes along with the increase in shifting, dual, and 
conflicting purposes among victims, witnesses, and police officers.  As 
Justice Scalia observed, “[s]orting out the primary purpose of a declarant 
with mixed motives is sometimes difficult.  But adding in the mixed 
motives of the police only compounds the problem.”221 
It is worth noting that Bryant’s dual purpose standard is not 
supported by the relevant case law.  In fact, Justice Sotomayor 
specifically rejected clear language from Davis identifying “‘the 
declarant’s statements, not the interrogator’s questions [as the statement] 
that the Confrontation Clause requires us to evaluate.’”222  According to 
the Bryant majority, the Davis Court did not mean (what it said) that the 
primary purpose of the victim/witness should control, but was instead 
“merely acknowledg[ing] that the Confrontation Clause is not implicated 
when statements are offered ‘for purposes other than establishing the 
truth of the matter asserted.’”223   
 
 218. Id. at 1168 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 219. Id. at 1160. 
 220. Id. at 1161. 
 221. Id. at 1170 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  On this point, Justice Scalia argues with undeniable 
logic that: 
The Court claims one affirmative virtue for its focus on the purposes of both the 
declarant and the police:  It “ameliorates problems that . . . arise” when declarants have 
“mixed motives.”  I am at a loss to know how. . . . Now courts will have to sort through 
two sets of mixed motives to determine the primary purpose of an interrogation.  And the 
Court’s solution creates a mixed-motive problem where (under the proper theory) it does 
not exist—viz., where the police and the declarant each have one motive, but those 
motives conflict. The Court does not provide an answer to this glaringly obvious 
problem, probably because it does not have one. 
Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted). 
 222. Id. at 1161 n.11 (quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822-23 & n.1 (2006)). 
 223. Id. (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 n.9 (2004)). 
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Justice Sotomayor’s interpretation ignores the fact that the quoted 
language from Davis appears, not within a discussion of hearsay as she 
has implied, but as support and elaboration for the Court’s holding that 
statements “are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate 
that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of 
the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant 
to later criminal prosecution.”224  Even more problematic is the Bryant 
majority’s selective omission of relevant introductory language.  When 
the sentence is quoted in full, it becomes obvious that the Davis Court 
was not discussing hearsay, but was instead explaining that “[a]nd of 
course even when interrogation exists, it is in the final analysis the 
declarant’s statement, not the interrogator’s questions that the 
Confrontation Clause requires us to evaluate.”225  The Davis Court 
clearly intended that the declarant’s statement and her intent when she 
made the statement provide the focus for the analysis. 
Finally, the Bryant Court further obfuscates the confrontation 
inquiry by reviving reliability concerns in two ways.  First, the Court 
reads into Davis the “implicit . . . idea that because the process of 
fabrication in statements given for the primary purpose of resolving an 
ongoing emergency is presumably significantly diminished, the 
Confrontation Clause does not require such statements to be subject to 
the crucible of cross-examination.”226  Thus, for the first time since 
Crawford, the Court has suggested that confrontation is not required, in 
part, because there was no time for a reasonable victim/witness to 
fabricate her statement.  Second, the Court finds that “some out-of-court 
statements—where the objective primary purpose of the investigation 
was not to resolve an ongoing emergency—do not raise confrontation 
concerns”227 and that for these statements, when “making the primary 
purpose determination, standard rules of hearsay, designed to identify 
some statements as reliable, will be relevant.”228  Unless the majority is 
making a vague reference to all non-testimonial statements, this dictum 
suggests an undefined class of mid-investigation out-of-court 
victim/witness statements not made to resolve a Davis/Bryant “ongoing 
emergency,” but not subject to confrontation. 
 
 224. Davis, 547 U.S. at 822. 
 225. Id. at 822 n.1 (emphasis added). 
 226. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1157. 
 227. Id. at 1155 (“But there may be other circumstances, aside from ongoing emergencies, 
when a statement is not procured with a primary purpose of creating an out-of-court substitute for 
trial testimony.”) (emphasis in original). 
 228. Id. at 1155. 
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C. Toward a New Confrontation Jurisprudence 
 It is clear that numerous important confrontation questions have not 
been resolved.  With Justice Scalia’s leadership waning, the Chief 
Justice and Justices Kennedy, Breyer and Alito are likely to gain traction 
to reframe the confrontation inquiry in the near future.  Their Melendez-
Diaz dissent lays the foundation for a revised approach focused on the 
question of whether the out-of-court declarant was a “witness[] against 
the accused.”229  To the extent that this determination includes greater 
consideration of the formality of the circumstances of “witnessing,” 
these Justices will gain purchase with Justice Thomas.   
There is also significant textual and doctrinal support for reframing 
the confrontation standard to focus on the distinction between 
“witnessing” and speaking.  Obviously, the text of the Sixth Amendment 
refers only to “witnesses.” As the Crawford Court explicitly recognized, 
not all declarants whose statements are proffered by the prosecution at 
trial are witnesses because “not all hearsay implicates the Sixth 
Amendment's core concerns.”230  Confrontation is principally guaranteed 
for those who serve as witnesses by making “formal statement[s] to 
government officers”231 because, for example, a “recorded statement 
knowingly given in response to structured police questioning qualifies 
[for confrontation] under any conceivable definition.”232   Moreover, 
“‘[a]n accuser who makes a formal statement to government officers’”233 
is a witness because she “‘bears testimony in a sense that a person who 
makes a casual remark does not.’”234  Similarly, in Davis when the 
victim made statements to the police during her mid-assault 911 call she 
“was not acting as a witness; she was not testifying. . . . [and w]hat she 
said was not a ‘weaker substitute for live testimony’ at trial . . . .”235  
Finally, the Bryant Court found that “the most important instances in 
which the Clause restricts the introduction of out-of-court statements are 
those in which state actors are involved in a formal, out-of-court 
interrogation of a witness to obtain evidence for trial.”236 
 
 229. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2543 (2009) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) 
(quoting Dowdell v. United States, 221 U.S. 325, 330 (1911)). 
 230. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004). 
 231. Id. (emphasis added). 
 232. Id. at 53 n.4 (emphasis added). 
 233. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 824 (2006) (quoting Crawford, 547 U.S. at 51). 
 234. Id. (quoting Crawford, 547 U.S. at 51). 
 235. Id. at 828 (quoting United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 394 (1986)). 
 236. Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1155 (2011) (emphasis added). 
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Further analytic support for a confrontation inquiry focused on the 
act of witnessing can be found in the seminal work of Professor Akhil 
Reed Amar.  Indeed, Professor Amar had long argued that “the obvious 
solution” to understanding what the Framers meant when they wrote the 
Confrontation Clause “is to heed the word ‘witness[]’ and its ordinary 
everyday meaning.”237  Professor Amar’s interpretation of the 
Confrontation Clause (which was cited by the Crawford Court)238 is 
based on the sensible assumption that “‘[a] Constitution that speaks in 
the name of the people and that draws its legitimacy from ratification by 
the people—ordinary citizens—should be presumed to use words in their 
ordinary sense . . . .”239  Thus, to borrow his persuasive yet simple 
example, “[i]f I tell my mom what I saw yesterday, and she later testifies 
in court, I am not the witness; she is.”240  
These arguments are consistent with Professor Amar’s 
“intratextualist” interpretation of constitutional text which reads “a 
contested word or phrase that appears in the Constitution in light of 
another passage in the Constitution featuring the same (or very similar 
word) or phrase.”241  Thus, the definition of “witness” in the 
Confrontation Clause must be consistent with the three other 
constitutional clauses that use the word “witness,”242 the Treason 
Clause,243 the Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination Clause,244 and the 
Compulsory Process Clause.245  Using both the “ordinary everyday 
meaning” and the intertextualist approaches, Professor Amar has 
repeatedly concluded that the Confrontation Clause “encompasses only 
those ‘witnesses’ who testify either by taking the stand in person or via 
government-prepared affidavits, depositions, videotapes, and the 
like.”246 
Finally, by focusing on the witness, rather than the testimonial 
nature of a statement, courts are likely to make more reliable and 
consistent confrontation decisions.  Although constitutional 
determinations inevitably involve ambiguity and uncertainty, we must 
 
 237. Akhil R. Amar, Sixth Amendment First Principles, 84 GEO. L.J. 641, 647 (1996). 
 238. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61. 
 239. Akhil R. Amar, Confrontation Clause First Principles:  A Reply to Professor Friedman, 
86 GEO. L.J. 1045, 1048 (1998). 
 240. Amar, supra note 237, at 647. 
 241. Akhil R. Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 748 (1999). 
 242. Amar, supra note 237. 
 243. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 1. 
 244. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 245. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 246. Amar, supra note 239, at 1045. 
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start from the analysis proposed in Bryant which would force the federal 
and state criminal courts to evaluate:  (1) “the statements and actions of 
both the declarant and interrogators;”247 (2) whether the ongoing 
emergency posed a threat to the public at large;248 (3) the “informality in 
an encounter between a victim and police;”249 (4) “[t]he parties’ 
perception that an emergency is ongoing;”250 (5) whether “the cause of 
the shooting was a purely private dispute;”251 (6) whether the suspect 
used a gun;252 (7) whether, at the time of the interrogation, the police 
knew the location of the suspect;253 and (8) whether the police asked the 
“type of questions necessary to allow the police to ‘assess the situation, 
the threat to their own safety, and possible danger to the potential 
victim’ and to the public . . . .”254   
It will not always be easy to determine which out-of-court 
declarants have acted as “witnesses against the accused.”  However, to 
the extent that assessing the act of “witnessing” shifts attention away 
from a multifactor guessing game on the objective primary purpose of 
the interrogation and towards more readily ascertainable external 
circumstances (e.g., efforts by the police to shape or control the 
victim’s/witness’s statement and/or facts that would indicate to a 
reasonable victim/witness that her statement implicating the suspect 
could have a trial purpose), this would enhance the legitimacy and 
consistency of future confrontation decisions.   
D. A Two-Pronged Confrontation Standard 
Although Bryant hints of a possible return to the bad old pre-
Crawford days when confrontation decisions were based on evidentiary 
reliability, a full retreat to this approach seems unlikely.255  In the future, 
the Court may build a variety of confrontation structures on its  
Crawford/Davis/Bryant foundation. For example, the Court could adopt 
a rebuttable two-pronged confrontation standard that might hew more 
 
 247. Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1148 (2011).   
 248. Id. at 1156. 
 249. Id. at 1160 (emphasis in original). 
 250. Id. at 1162 (emphasis added). 
 251. Id. at 1163. 
 252. Id. at 1164. 
 253. Id. at 1163. 
 254. Id. at 1166 (quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 832 (2006)). 
 255. Id. at 1155 (“In making the primary purpose determination, standard rules of hearsay, 
designed to identify some statements as reliable, will be relevant.”). 
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closely to the relevant text, clarify the process, and yet remain consistent 
with the post-Crawford doctrine. 
This approach would guarantee defendants the opportunity to 
confront all out-of-court “witness against the accused” whose status as a 
“witness” was established by the defense either:   
 
(1) by ascertainable facts and circumstances demonstrating 
that the making of the statement was the functional 
equivalent of providing trial testimony; or in the alternative  
 
(2) by ascertainable facts and circumstances demonstrating 
that the making of the statement was the functional 
equivalent of providing testimony because the police and/or 
the crime victim/witness understood and intended, or 
should have understood and intended, that the 
victim/witness was making a record that could be used to 
prosecute the defendant. 
 
Analysis of the facts under the first prong would be fairly 
straightforward and should result in more predictable and consistent 
judicial decisions.  For example, the first prong could be satisfied:  (1) 
under all of the specific circumstances described in Crawford, (i.e., 
“prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a 
former trial; and . . . police interrogations”256); (2) with Professor 
Amar’s list of “affidavits, depositions, videotapes, and the like;”257 or (3) 
if, as (then) Solicitor General Kagan suggested in her Bryant brief, with 
evidence of police control over the location, duration, and structure of 
the victim/witness interview or evidence of any attempt by the police to 
shape the statement for use in a future criminal trial.258 
If the defendant lacked evidence to satisfy the first prong, 
confrontation would be guaranteed only if the defense proffered relevant 
and reliable evidence that the police or the victim/witness understood 
and intended (or that a reasonable police officer or victim/witness in the 
same circumstances would have understood and intended) that the 
statement provided by the victim/witness could be used as inculpatory 
evidence by the prosecutor at trial.   
 
 256. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004). 
 257. Amar, supra note 239, at 1045. 
 258. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 175, at 
17.  
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Like the current Crawford/Davis/Bryant inquiry, this two-pronged 
analysis would require the Court to carefully consider dynamic mid-
investigation facts and circumstances.  However, the inquiry would be 
cabined by the Court’s focus on evidence indicating that the out-of-court 
declarant was effectively serving as a witness.  In this context, formality 
that does not rise to the level required by the first prong (along with any 
of the seven other Bryant factors) would be considered only if this 
evidence shed light on the question of whether the crime victim/witness 
understood and intended, or should have understood and intended, that 
she was making a record that could be used to prosecute the defendant.   
This two-pronged approach is just one possible first step towards a 
more consistent analytic process focused on the fundamental objective 
of barring prosecutors from using ex parte testimony against the 
accused.  In many cases, this approach would yield results consistent 
with the recent confrontation doctrine.  For example, Sylvia Crawford’s 
written and Mirandized stationhouse statement, Amy Hammon’s sworn 
“battery affidavit,” and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts’ 
“certificates of analysis” would all satisfy both prongs.  Michelle 
McCottry’s mid-assault 911 call would not satisfy either prong.  Finally, 
Anthony Covington’s identification of the defendant would clearly not 
satisfy prong one and, given the limited police opportunity to develop, 
structure, or control the victim’s statement, under these circumstances 
neither Mr. Covington, nor a reasonable victim, would have understood 
and intended that by identifying his unapprehended assailant, he was 
making a record that would be used at trial.  However, as discussed 
below, there are both legal and social costs to this approach. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
With the recent decision in Bryant, Justice Scalia has lost control of 
the Court’s confrontation jurisprudence.  However, his rancorous view 
that Bryant is an “opinion [that] distorts our Confrontation Clause 
jurisprudence and leaves it in a shambles,”259 may prove prescient.  He 
may also be correct that Bryant will “create[] an expansive exception to 
the Confrontation Clause for violent crimes”260 that will be exploited by 
future police and prosecutors.  As new cases arise, criminal courts will 
need to adapt to avoid fulfilling Justice Scalia’s prediction that pre-
Crawford “reliability . . . [will return] to guide our Confrontation Clause 
jurisprudence, at least where emergencies and faux emergencies are 
 
 259. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1168 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 260. Id. at 1173. 
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concerned.”  This can and should be avoided, and some of the Bryant 
“uncertainty . . . for law enforcement and the lower courts”261 corrected.   
However, this Article concludes with an honest acknowledgment 
that any effort to narrow the confrontation focus to enhance analytic and 
operational consistency could have significant legal and social costs. 
The first legal cost (which I raise here, but will elaborate on in 
future work) is to defense challenges under Bruton v. United States.262  
In Bruton, the Supreme Court interpreted the Confrontation Clause to 
bar the admission of a codefendant's confession implicating the other 
defendant at a joint trial.  Prior to Bruton, federal and state criminal 
courts had generally assumed that confessions by one defendant that 
implicated a codefendant (i.e., an interlocking confession) could be 
admitted without violating the Confrontation Clause if the judge 
instructed the jury that the confession was admissible only against the 
confessing codefendant.263  The Bruton Court recognized the naivety of 
this solution: “[t]he fact of the matter is that too often such admonition 
against misuse is intrinsically ineffective in that the effect of such a 
nonadmissible declaration cannot be wiped from the brains of the 
jurors.”264  After Bruton, federal and state prosecutors can only admit a 
non-testifying codefendant’s interlocking confession, if it has been 
effectively redacted or if the defendants trial are severed and the 
confession is introduced only against the defendant who made it.  Over 
the past forty years, the Court has further distinguished confessions that 
explicitly and directly incriminated co-defendants from those that 
incriminated co-defendants only inferentially when combined with other 
evidence.265  The Court has also clarified that the Confrontation Clause 
is violated even when the defendant’s own confession (reciting 
 
 261. Id. at 1174. 
 262. 391 U.S. 123 (1968). 
 263. See, e.g., Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232, 238 (1957) (holding that it is possible 
for jurors to follow jury instructions to disregard inculpatory references to a non-confessing co-
defendant).  
264.  Bruton, 391 U.S. at 129.  The Bruton Court clarified the scope of their decision noting that 
“in many cases the jury can and will follow the trial judge’s instructions to disregard such 
information.  . . . [however,] there are some contexts in which the risk that the jury will not, or 
cannot, follow instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, that 
the practical and human limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored.” Id. at 135. 
265.  In Richardson v. Marsh, the Court found that when a confession “was not incriminating 
on its face, and became so only when linked with evidence introduced later at trial (the defendant’s 
own testimony)[,]. . . . it is a less valid generalization that the jury will not likely obey the 
instruction to disregard the evidence.”  481 U.S. 200, 208 (1987).  See also United States v. 
Spagnola, 632 F.3d 981, 988 (7th Cir. 2011) (“A Bruton violation occurs only if the confession of a 
non-testifying co-defendant facially incriminates the non-confessing co-defendant.”).  
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essentially the same information) was introduced at trial266 or if the 
nontestifying codefendant’s confession was ineffectively redacted.267   
However, over the past seven years, federal and state criminal 
courts have increasingly found that it is now “necessary to view Bruton 
through the lens of Crawford and Davis.”268  To the extent that a 
clarification of the confrontation standard is used to limit its scope, 
defendants will be increasingly barred from raising Bruton challenges to 
inculpatory (but non-testimonial) out-of-court statements made by non-
testifying codefendants whenever this evidence survives hearsay 
challenges (e.g., statements against interest, coconspirator statements).269 
A second legal predictable cost is that law enforcement could 
respond with new strategies and practices designed to prevent the 
formalization (and thus enhance the admissibility) of crime 
victim/witness statements.270  Presumably blatant police efforts to evade 
confrontation would not be tolerated.  As the Davis Court noted, it 
would not be acceptable if “the protections of the Confrontation Clause 
can readily be evaded by having a note-taking policeman recite the 
 
266.  See Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186, 193 (1987) (“We hold, where a nontestifying 
codefendant's confession incriminating the defendant is not directly admissible against the 
defendant, the Confrontation Clause bars its admission at their joint trial, even if the jury is 
instructed not to consider it against the defendant, and even if the defendant’s own confession is 
admitted against him.”). 
267.  See Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 193 (1998) (“Redactions that simply replace a name 
with an obvious blank space or a word such as ‘deleted’ or a symbol or other similarly obvious 
indications of alteration, however, leave statements that, considered as a class, so closely resemble 
Bruton's unredacted statements that, in our view, the law must require the same result.”). See also 
United States v. West, No. 08 CR 669, 2011 WL 1313706 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 10, 2011) (finding that a 
court “can and should consider the surrounding circumstances in determining whether the redacted 
statement impermissibly identifies a non-testifying co-defendant”).  
268.  United States v. Figueroa-Cartagena, 612 F.3d 69, 85 (1st Cir. 2010). See also United 
States v. Dale, 614 F.3d 942 (8th Cir. 2010) (holding that after Crawford the admission of a 
nontestifying codefendant’s interlocking confession recorded by a jail house informant did not 
violate the defendant’s right to confrontation because it was non-testimonial); United States v. 
Johnson, 581 F.3d 320, 326 (6th Cir. 2009) (“the Bruton rule, like the confrontation clause itself, 
does not apply to non-testimonial statements”); People v. Arceo, 195 Cal. App. 4th 556 (2011) 
(same).  But see United States v. Williams, No. 1:09cr414 (JCC), 2010 WL 3909480 (E.D. Va. Sept. 
23, 2010) (rejecting the argument that, after Crawford, Bruton should be limited to testimonial 
statements). 
269.  See, e.g., United States v. Dale, 614 F.3d 942 (8th Cir. 2010) (holding that after Crawford 
the admission of a nontestifying co-defendant’s interlocking confession recorded by a jail house 
informant did not violate the defendant’s right to confrontation). 
 270. Joshua C. Dickinson, The Confrontation Clause and the Hearsay Rule:  The Current State 
of a Failed Marriage in Need of a Quick Divorce, 33 CREIGHTON L. REV. 763, 811 (2000) (noting 
that “to distinguish between statements made in formalized testimonial setting versus informal 
investigative setting, as Justice Thomas proposes . . . may encourage police and prosecutors shift the 
emphasis of their investigation in more informal settings so as to avoid confrontation clause 
problems”). 
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unsworn testimony of the declarant, instead of having the declarant sign 
a deposition.”271  Law enforcement agents would also be forced to weigh 
the confrontation implications of formalization against a range of 
competing investigatory and evidentiary benefits and concerns (e.g., 
preserving evidence, obtaining sworn statements).  However, any shift in 
police practices that enables police to insulate victims/witnesses who 
provide inculpatory evidence from cross-examination would undermine 
what Professor Andrew Taslitz has identified as “the primary, although 
not necessarily sole, purpose of the Confrontation Clause [which] is 
preventing governmental misconduct in the creation of evidence.”272 
A social cost, which would transcend state and federal law 
enforcement, is the resulting diminished reliability of a wide range of 
federal, state and local public records.  The paradox of formality is that 
under normal circumstances we require that certain statements be 
formalized (e.g., affidavits, sworn statements, depositions) to ensure 
their accuracy and reliability.  For example, in Melendez-Diaz, state law 
required that each of the three certificates of analysis be sworn to before 
a notary public.273  The Massachusetts statute was designed to serve two 
purposes:  (1) to help ensure the accuracy of state forensic laboratory 
analyses; and (2) to provide prima facie evidence of the composition, 
quality, and weight of the tested substance that could be admitted in lieu 
of live testimony.274  By requiring analyst confrontation, the Melendez-
Diaz Court focused solely on the second goal.  However, over the past 
few years Melendez-Diaz has been applied to an increasingly broad 
range of government records formalized via affidavits, notarization, 
certification or other processes. 275  This creates powerful incentives for a 
 
 271. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 826 (2006) (emphasis in original). 
 272. Andrew E. Taslitz, What Remains of Reliability:  Hearsay and Freestanding Due Process 
after Crawford v. Washington, 20 CRIM. JUST. MAG. 39 (2005) (citing the pre-Crawford work of 
Margaret Berger, The Deconstitutionalization of the Confrontation Clause:  A Proposal for a 
Prosecutorial Restraint Model, 76 MINN. L. REV. 557 (1992); Dickinson, supra note 270, at 803-07; 
Richard D. Friedman & Bridget McCormack, Dial-In Testimony, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1171, 1246-52 
(2002)), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/criminal_justice_magazine_home/crimjust_cjmag_20_2_t
aslitz.html.  
 273. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2531 (2009). 
 274. Id. at 2532 (providing that the “purpose of the affidavits was to provide ‘prima facie 
evidence of the composition, quality, and the net weight’ of the analyzed substance” (quoting MASS. 
GEN. LAWS, ch. 111, § 13)). 
 275. Stephen N. Yermish, Melendez-Diaz and the Application of Crawford in the Lab, THE 
CHAMPION, Aug. 29, 2009, at 28, 32 (“The decision in Melendez-Diaz has the potential to impact a 
host of criminal cases beyond the drug possession case to which it was specifically directed.”) 
available at 
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wide range of government agencies to reduce or eliminate formalization 
requirements, which presumably will diminish the accuracy of public 
records and make it more difficult to penalize fraud and negligence. 
No confrontation solution is perfect.  When Justice Scalia wrote for 
a unanimous Court in Crawford, his purported goal was to replace the 
“inherently, and therefore permanently unpredictable”276 rules of 
evidence with a new confrontation inquiry that would better reflect the 
constitutional text, the framer’s intent, legal history, and core fair trial 
principles.  However, Justice Scalia’s valiant seven-year effort to 
prevent the admission of “statements that do consist of ex parte 
testimony upon a mere finding of reliability”277 is increasingly 
threatened by the Court’s own confusing and ambiguous doctrine.  The 
Crawford Court was clearly correct that a defendant’s right to confront 
must trump federal and state evidence rules under many circumstances.   
But the fair administration of justice demands that confrontation have a 
sensible meaning and consistent effect so that these interests will be 
protected in future criminal trials. 
 
http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/01c1e7698280d20385256d0b00789923/ed3658d5274f862d852576
43005f5780?OpenDocument. 
 276. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 n.10 (2004) (emphasis in original). 
 277. Id. at 60 (emphasis in original). 
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